Why Elections Fail to Produce Alternation? Institutional Capture and Regime Durability in Sub-Saharan Africa

Why do multiparty elections in Sub-Saharan Africa so rarely produce political alternation despite decades of formal democratic competition? This article introduces the concept of the “Regime of Total Institutional Capture” (RCIT; French: Régime à Capture Institutionnelle Totale). – a political system in which formally autonomous institutions (electoral commissions, courts, media, legislatures) are systematically coordinated to ensure incumbent reproduction. Building on the insights of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2010), RCIT offers a complementary analytical framework centered on systemic institutional coordination rather than merely an uneven playing field. Using an original Institutional Capture Index (IS-RCIT) based on V‑Dem, Freedom House, and Afrobarometer data for 24 countries over 1990–2024, we find a strong, non‑linear relationship between institutional capture and alternation. Below a critical threshold (IS‑RCIT ≈ 0.75–0.80), alternation remains possible. Above this threshold, the probability of alternation approaches zero – a tipping point that standard linear models do not predict. This finding reframes how we understand elections under authoritarianism. In high‑capture contexts, elections do not primarily function as mechanisms of uncertainty, but as instruments of controlled predictability – legitimizing incumbents, structuring elite competition, and reinforcing political stability without turnover. Electoral reforms alone are unlikely to produce alternation where institutional capture is systemic. Democracy promotion must therefore address the entire architecture of institutional coordination, not just discrete procedural fixes.